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This paper will review the progress DoD has made in reaching the mobility requirements set forth by successive national security strategies since the Gulf War. It will review each leg of the mobility triad, airlift, sealift and prepositioning, to assess DoD's efforts and effectiveness in reaching the goals set forth by the mobility requirements studies conducted since the end of ODS/S. Finally it will offer an assessment of the present state of DoD's strategic mobility and how it is postured to meet the challenges of current and future conflict.
"Strategic mobility operations in support of Operations Desert Shield/Storm were extraordinarily successful. However, the level of effort required to ensure success again reaffirmed the long-standing consensus of leaders in the military, private industry, and Congress concerning the woeful condition of the strategic mobility posture of the United States."
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In this new era, therefore, the ability to project our power will underpin our strategy more than ever. We must be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where prepositioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be available (at least before a crisis) and where there is a less developed industrial base and infrastructure to support our forces once they have arrived.
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The potential for contingencies in regions outside Europe continues to grow. As a result, strategic mobility takes on increased importance. The Defense Department will continue to place a high priority on the maintenance and improvement of U.S. strategic mobility forces.
AIRLIFT
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm saw a major shift in the use of airlift for the movement of warfighting materials and personnel. In all previous conflicts, airlifts contribution to the overall amount of material shipped to the theater was relatively small in comparison to sealift. Strategic lift planning factors called for airlift to account for 95 percent of overall lift requirements until the sea lines of communication had been established, which is generally thirty days after the start of the first strategic movement. Sealift is planned to provide only 5 percent in this first phase of deployment and then after day thirty the percentages will reverse with sealift providing 95 percent of all strategic lift requirements. However, in ODS/S airlift accounted for 15 percent of all strategic lift needed for the war effort and more significantly provided 30 percent of the resupplies to the theater. The airlift operations conducted during ODS/S were considered to be quite successful.
However there were several good lessons learned for future contingency operations. The basic task of integration of all the elements of the airlift proved to be more difficult then previously envisioned. The CRAF provided a responsive and proficient capability but lacked the flexibility provided by military aircraft. 7 Since this was the first full-scale call up of the CRAF, many common military type tasks assumed by military airlift planners presented unique challenges for their civilian counterparts. Unfamiliarity with the processing and carrying of hazardous cargo, different communications equipment and procedures, and at times the lack of equipment presented challenges to the civilian crew. The military pilot's average age was thirty years while the civilian pilot's average age was fifty-five. 8 This age difference was a major factor in the decision process to waive operational flying hour restrictions by the civilian airlines that was a normal process for military operations.
9
Operational requirements for ODS/S on the C-141 and C-5 fleet were debilitating to the overall health of these aircraft. Operational restrictions on these aircraft limited them to carrying only 75 percent of their maximum load capacity. The high pace of operations aged the overall fleet by one and one half times their normal operational pace. The C-5's tempo was almost three and one half times their normal peacetime commitment.
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Following operations in the Gulf War, Congress directed the first Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) to provide necessary direction for the strategic mobility shortfalls associated with ODS/S. 11 This study was supplemented by DoD's Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) in 1993. This study served as a wakeup call to DoD on the importance of strategic mobility and specifically in airlift. As stated in the MRS: "To support national interests, deployment capability must increase through…sustained investment in airlift." 12 The study characterized Desert Shield deployments as being conducted with considerable risk due to the inability of mobility forces to project power quickly. Force. 17 Additionally, the C-5 fleet's maintenance requirements resulted in 30-40 percent of the fleet being grounded at any one given moment.
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The identified remedy to the airlift problem was the acquisition of the C-17. The C-17
gives the capability to carry a considerably larger payload, including outsize cargo, to more places worldwide then was currently possible. One study conducted showed that if the C-17
had replaced the C-141 during ODS/S, airlift deployment requirements would have been completed 20-35 percent faster. 19 However, the acquisition program was wrought with controversy and problems. The Air Force's original plan in 1981 was to purchase 210 aircraft.
This amount was scaled back to 120 in 1990 due to cost overruns and technical problems.
Congress began a review of the program and initially limited the purchase to only forty aircraft 
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In late 1998, the commander of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and Air
Mobility Command (AMC) described the mobility forces as "healthy." The state of the force was the result of lessons learned in the Gulf War and increased emphasis on the mobility lift requirements. 22 However, AMC did not consider a special operations requirement the C-141
was performing when it set the C-17 requirement at 120. This requirement would draw 15 C-17s from the fleet and thus reduce the amount of airlift available. 
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Participation in the CRAF was on the rebound after a drop following the Gulf War.
Participating carriers had major concerns with insurance on the aircraft, safety of the pilots and loss of business to non-participating competitors during ODS/S. However, the AMC commander had vigorously pursued new practices and policies that brought CRAF participants back to the program. At this time all CRAF requirements were met with the exception of aeromedical evacuation (five planes short of requirements). This was not a major concern however since this particular requirement was in the third stage of CRAF to be called up. CRAF participation in ODS/S only required implementation of Stage II. The overall participation in Stage III CRAF, both wide body equivalents and cargo capacity, currently exceeds 128 percent of requirements. 27 As the TRANSCOM commander stated: "CRAF is good for the Air Force, DoD, and our industrial partners, and we're going to try to keep it that way for all of them."
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The MRS-05 further defined the requirements for strategic airlift. An airlift fleet of 49.7
MTM/D (as set by the MRS BURU) is not adequate to meet the range of requirements. This is primarily due to newly identified intra-theater lift requirements and to consideration of missions additional to those supporting the two-major theater war scenario. This analysis of intra-theater lift and the additional supporting missions were not included in previous studies. 29 Based on missions directly supporting the warfighting demands, the study identified a need for a minimum of 51.1 MTM/D of airlift capacity. This figure included the newly identified support for highpriority movements with the theaters. 30 The study identified the likelihood of other demands on the airlift system during peak periods of operations early in major theater campaigns. These demands would be closely associated with the conduct of theater operations and thus were considered to be additive to the 51.1 MTM/D. These high priority missions--conducting special operations, deploying missile defense systems to friendly nations and support to other theater commanders not directly engaged in campaigns--would increase the total airlift requirement to 54.4 MTM/D. The establishment of this airlift capability is the minimum moderate risk capability to support the National Military Strategy. 31 To provide this airlift capacity MRS-05 recommended DoD to consider providing additional C-17s, improvements to the performance of the C-5 fleet, additional services that could be provided by commercial operators, and sources to be used for missions of short duration.
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Right now the United States does not have enough airlift to meet the requirements set out in the MRS-05. Today's capacity is less than 46 MTM/D. In order to meet the needs set forth in MRS-05, the Air Force has developed a Global Mobility Roadmap. 33 It had already resolved the special operations requirement in 2000 by programming an additional fourteen C-17s at the end of the current procurement of 120. This new procurement raised the total number to 134. 34 To fill the gap in capacity the plan is to acquire additional C-17s and to modernize the C-5s and C130s. While in 2002 Congress approved the purchase of 60 additional aircraft (total 180), the MRS-05 minimum requirement necessitates the procurement of at least 222 C-17s.
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The C-5 is a very important part of the airlift capacity because it can handle nearly 100,000 pounds more cargo then a C-17. This makes it the primary aircraft to move large numbers of assets from the CONUS to the war zone. However, the aircraft is aging with 76 of the total 126 aircraft over thirty years old. 36 Mission capable rates were the focus of a General Accounting Office study which identified a substantial shortfall in airlift capacity to the tune of 3.51 MTM/D based on the MRS BURU. 37 To remedy this problem the Air Force started a twophased approach: a $454 million program to update the flight-controls, communications and navigation systems and instrument displays, and a $1.1 billion contract to start system development of a reliability enhancement and reengineering program (RERP). For the RERP program, four C-5s will be modernized and demonstrate the improvement in mission capability rates. 38 If the results meet the expectations then modernization of the fleet should begin in
2007. The success of this modernization program will ultimately decide the total numbers of C-17s needed to meet requirements. moved during the first year of the Korean War. This is more impressive considering the distance to the Southwest Asia operation and the fact the Navy, the U.S. merchant fleet, and the reserve ship force were much smaller than they were in 1950. About 3.3 million short tons of dry cargo was delivered to the area of operations. As stated earlier, about 15 percent of this amount was delivered by air with the remaining majority delivered by sealift. 42 The volume of shipping used during the entire operation was so great that it could be referred to as a "steel bridge." At its peak, about 132 ships were enroute to the Gulf, 44 were returning home from the Gulf and 28 were being loaded and unloaded at various ports. 
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The overall performance of the FSSs was good. The average time to activate these ships was six days and the first ship to arrive at its port of embarkation sailed six days and six hours after arrival. The entire eight ships set sail within sixteen days of activation. 
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The primary purpose of the RRF ships is to support strategic sealift with a combination of commercial ships that have a military useful capability (RO/RO, tankers, crane ships and breakbulk) and are maintained in 5-10-20 day readiness status. The RRF consisted of ninety-six ships including eighty-three dry cargo ships, this included seventeen RO/RO ships and eight crane ships, nine tankers and two troop ships. The RRF ships are berthed in various ports throughout the U. S. close to potential load-out locations.
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The average age of the RRF ships was twenty-four years with most being acquired in the late seventies and mid eighties at the end of their commercial viability. Eighty of the ninety-six ships were powered by old steam propulsion engines. The availability of parts and experience to operate the ships was a major problem. In the commercial merchant marine all propulsion engines are diesel driven. 49 The activation of the ships proved to be a very labor intensive operation. The amount of man-days needed to get each ship operational was between 800 and 1200 hours. Poor material condition and years of delayed routine maintenance were the main culprits. In fact, 67 percent of the RRF ships are designated in the five day readiness category;
however the average time to activation was between nine and one half and ten days.
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Manning of the ships was also a major problem. Since most of the ships were of the old steam variety finding qualified individuals was difficult. The average age of the crew was fifty-five years with several individuals called out of retirement (146 individuals were older than 62).
Some of the crews were manned by recent graduates of the Merchant Marine Academy who had never sailed before.
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As should be expected, the RRF force performance could not be judged a success. Of the forty-four RRF ships activated for Phase I only twelve completed activation duties on time.
Twelve ships were anywhere from one to five days late, and twenty were at least six days late.
For Phase II, the activation did not improve. Only three of twenty-six ships activated on time, seventeen were more than five days late. 52 The age of the vessels, the material condition of the ships and the lack of adequate merchant seamen to operate them were the major limitations in the responsiveness of these ships. 53 Once fully operational, the RRF ship performed well and delivered about 30 percent of the unit equipment and related support in Phase I and 25 percent in Phase II.
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Commercial charter ships turned out to be a little recognized but crucial element in the overall sealift operation. Military Sealift Command utilized the commercial charter for four basic reasons. First, RO/ROs were the ship of choice and there were only seventeen in the RRF.
Second, the activation of the RRF was much slower than planned and anticipated. Third, there were sufficient doubts as to the ability to find available crews for the RRF during the initial stages of the operation. Fourth, the cost of activation of the RRF is more than the cost of the commercial charters. The 1992 MRS that followed ODS/S identified the sealift shortfalls and made substantial recommendations for improvements. Specifically the study called for additional sealift capabilities equal to twenty large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSR) of 380,000 ft 2 total capacity, add three million ft 2 of surge sealift capability for rapid deployment using eleven
LMSRs and expand the RRF from ninety-six ships to 142 ships (of which 104 will be dry cargo). 58 The MRS BURU of 1995 basically reiterated these same sealift requirements adjusting the number of LMSRs to nineteen. While the MSP has provided a viable solution to the problem of access to commercial U.S. flagged shipping the longer term problem of the decline in the U.S. population of qualified mariners available to man the RRF is still a major concern. The decline in actual numbers is further compounded by new maritime conventions and codes affecting training and certification requirements. The result is a further reduced pool of merchant mariners capable of sailing DoD surge sealift assets.
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"I wholeheartedly support reauthorization of MSP beyond expiration of the current authority on September 30, 2005. The MSP is a vital element of our military's strategic sealift and global response capability. As we look at operations on multiple fronts in support of the War on Terrorism, it is clear that our limited defense resources will increasingly rely on partnerships with industry to maintain the needed capability and capacity to meet our most demanding wartime scenarios. That makes MSP reauthorization even more important as we look toward the future. MSP is a cost effective program that assures guaranteed access to required commercial U.S. Flag shipping and U.S. Merchant Mariners, when needed. The alternative to MSP is, ultimately, reliance on foreign flag vessels manned by foreign crews during crisis. MSP provides the security of resources we must have in a very uncertain world fraught with asymmetric threats. MSP ensures the development and sustainment of critical strategic partnerships favorable to the United States. And, MSP helps ensure the viability of America's merchant mariner pool needed to activate the Reserve Fleet. MSP makes sense. We can't afford not to invest in MSP. I strongly advocate for swift reauthorization."
The status of the sealift portion of the mobility triad today has been described as healthy.
The sealift capability has met three important requirements: prepositioned equipment and supplies afloat for immediate response, surge capability for rapid power projection and sustainment for support of longer duration engagements. In 2002, the last LMSR ship was delivered and the requirements from the MRS BURU were finally reached. That being said however, the sealift requirement from the MRS 05 study did increase by one million tons relative to the previous guidance--MRS BURU. 
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The MRS-05 study concluded that the sealift investments conducted in response to the MRS BURU have proven to be sufficient. The overall mobility capability can be further augmented through the use of commercial sealift enabled by selective containerization of unit equipment. 69 The programmed organic dry cargo fleet is adequate to meet projected needs.
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However, as good as the condition of the sealift force is now; this capability will continue to grow older. The future requirements of sealift will continue to change based on the emerging environment. Continued programming of funds to recapitalize the ships in the RRF is a must.
Funding must be continued to sustain the current level of sealift readiness and capacity of the surge forces, FSSs and LMSRs for the long term. Vigilance and adherence to the vision is a must in order to preserve the important gains made during the past decade for these important deployment assets.
PREPOSITIONING
"While fast sealift and RRF ships proved their worth, the stars of the Desert Shield buildup were the maritime prepositioning ships and the afloat prepositioning ships." 
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The MRS recommended the Army support aboard prepositioning ships the equipment needed for a heavy combat brigade and an initial army logistics base. This force was to be the nucleus of the Army's contingency corps in theater. 75 The Army has followed these recommendations and the current preposition stocks include:
• APS-1 located in CONUS with sustainment stocks
• APS-2 located in Europe with two brigade stets in North-Central Europe, one brigade set in Italy and a battalion of self-propelled artillery in Norway
• APS-3 afloat vessels in the Pacific and Indian Ocean aboard 15 U.S. ships. These carry two brigade sets of equipment and a corps set of combat service support equipment, as well as 30 days' supplies for an Army corps.
• APS-4 in the Pacific with one brigade set in Korea as well as sustainment stocks in Japan and Korea.
• APS-5 in Southwest Asia with one brigade set in Kuwait and one brigade set and a division base set in Qatar.
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The Marine MPS program has maintained is status since the size of the Marine Corps has not changed its congressionally mandated force structure. However, the value of MPS has been recognized and an additional LMSR has been designated for the Maritime Prepositioning
Force -Enhanced (MPF-E) to provide additional capability to the Marine Corps. 77 The MRS-05
did not have any specific recommendations to improve the prepositioning portion of the mobility triad. aviation support equipment and Navy munitions. 81 As potential war with Iraq looms on the horizon, the Army has increased the amount of prepositioned equipment in Kuwait to be able to handle a brigade size -about 6000 troops-deployment. 82 Even with its potential limiting factor "Our ability to rapidly project power worldwide depends on four strategic mobility enhancements: increased airlift capability, additional prepositioning of heavy equipment afloat and ashore, increased surge capacity of sealift, and improved readiness and responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force." 1995 National Military Strategy 79 of correctly guessing where to preposition the equipment, the investment made by DoD in this area has been money well spent and should never be discounted. "The Army moves by sea." This comment was made by a retired general officer during a briefing at the U.S. Army War College. Sealift capability is another area that has made substantial improvements. This is the first capability to meet the requirements as set forth in the MRS BURU and remains about as equally capable based on MRS 05 requirements. From a force of zero to twenty LMSRs, the question of surge capacity has been met. The questions of operating status of the RRF that cropped up during ODS/S are being addressed. Since the Gulf War there have been 147 no-notice drills and only two ships failed to sail on time and then only by less than 10 hours. 83 The one area that remains a question mark is the availability of qualified crews to man the ships of the RRF. Implementation of the VISA and MPS programs are a step in the right direction but continued pressure from foreign shipping companies remain.
DO CURRENT CAPABILITIES MEET OUR NEEDS
This is a long term problem and must be continually monitored and programs to help alleviate it must be vigorously pursued. However, we can ill afford to rest on these past achievements or we risk once again falling into the pre-Gulf War deployment nightmare.
Word Count = 6,206 "Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary."
??Sun Tzu
